Privacy Preserving Distributed OLAP is becoming a critical challenge for next-generation Business Intelligence (BI) scenarios, due to the "natural suitability" of OLAP in analyzing distributed massive BI repositories in a multidimensional and multi-granularity manner. In particular, in these scenarios XML-formatted BI repositories play a dominant role, due to the well-know amenities of XML in modeling and representing distributed business data. However, while Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining has been widely investigated, the problem of effectively and efficiently supporting privacy preserving OLAP over distributed collections of XML documents, which is relevant in practice, has been neglected so far. In order to fulfill this gap, we propose a novel Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC)-based privacy preserving OLAP framework for distributed collections of XML documents. The framework has many novel features ranging from nice theoretical properties to an effective and efficient protocol, called Secure Distributed OLAP aggregation protocol (SDO). The efficiency of our approach has been validated by an experimental evaluation over distributed collections of synthetic, benchmark and real-life XML documents.
Introduction
OLAP [14, 17] data cubes [42] play a central role in next-generation Business Intelligence (BI) systems, mainly because of the fact that they support both multidimensional and multi-granularity analysis of large data sets, with a performance that cannot be achieved by traditional OLTP systems (e.g., SQL interfaces over DBMS). Nevertheless, due to the "semantically-rich" nature of data cubes (e.g., [24, 56] ) and the availability of a large variety of OLAP queries and operators (e.g., [34, 47, 90] ), OLAP can be exploited by malicious users seeking to infer sensitive knowledge from corporate data repositories underlying OLAP server platforms [84] .
Such a problem, which significantly impacts on the trustworthiness and reliability of OLAP server platforms, has motivated the development of recent approaches addressing the problem of devising meaningful privacy preserving OLAP techniques (e.g., [4, 22, 35, 46, 48, 73, 84, 85, 94, 23, 58, 5, 77] ). This is a fundamental problem in Privacy Preserving Data Mining [3] research and has recently attracted the interest of a large community of Database and Data Warehousing researchers [11, 21, 65] .
The proposed approaches address two apparently-similar but indeed-different problems. The first problem deals with preserving the privacy of singleton data cubes in centralized client-server environments (e.g., [22, 35, 48, 73, 84, 85, 94, 23, 58, 5] ). The second one focuses on supporting privacy preserving OLAP over multiple distributed data sources (e.g., [4, 77, 46] ). In other words, the first problem can be viewed as the problem of computing a privacy preserving data cube from an (already-materialized) data cube, while the second problem can be viewed as the problem of computing a privacy preserving data cube from distributed data sources. Such dichotomy has motivated our research.
Another important research perspective that has motivated our efforts is the fact that XML is the predominant data definition and exchange language for data repositories in BI systems, and large amounts of business data are now represented in XML and accessed by means of XML query languages such as XQuery [88] and XPath [87] . With respect to storage issues related to business data, we identify two meaningful alternatives. The first alternative is a native approach in which data cubes are represented in terms of repositories of XML documents on top of which a certain DW logical schema (e.g., star or snowflake schemas - [83] ) and a built-in multidimensional access method [36] are defined. The second alternative is based on a full-materialization approach in which multidimensional data are represented in terms of XML cubes [52, 62] that directly store materialized data cells aggregated from the target collection of XML documents. Both alternatives have merits; in particular, the native approach is more flexible whereas the full-materialization approach improves OLAP query performance.
Motivated by these considerations, in this paper we investigate the problem of effectively and efficiently supporting privacy preserving OLAP over distributed XML documents. Therefore, with respect to the above classification we consider the case of privacy preserving OLAP in distributed environments populated by (distributed) collections of (native) XML documents.
Such case can be considered as a typical Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining problem [16] , where the main goal is to efficiently support Data Mining activities (e.g., association rule mining [81, 53] , clustering [82, 49, 50] , and so forth) across multiple distributed databases while ensuring that (i) no participant can access sensitive data stored in databases of other participants, and (ii) no participant can infer sensitive knowledge other than the knowledge obtained by the target Data Mining activity. However, while Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining has been widely investigated, and a plethora of proposal exists (e.g., [81, 53, 82, 49, 50] ), the problem of effectively and efficiently supporting privacy preserving OLAP over distributed collections of XML documents, which is relevant in practice, has been neglected so far. In this research, we fulfill this so-germane gap, and provide both theoretical and technical contributions to the wider scientific area recognized in literature under the term "privacy preserving OLAP".
A possible approach to address the problem above is based on the Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) [91, 40, 66] model. Several Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining protocols have been designed and engineered based on SMC. These basic protocols can then be used as building blocks for more complex Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining tasks. Among such tasks, we recall [16] : (i) the secure sum (e.g., [72] ), which computes the (secure) sum of a set of sensitive values; (ii) the secure set union (e.g., [67] ), which computes the (secure) union set from distributed sets; (iii) the secure size of set intersection (e.g., [33] ), which computes the (secure) size of the intersection set from distributed sets; (iv) secure scalar product (e.g., [38] ), which computes the (secure) scalar product between two Boolean vectors.
In the reference application scenario investigated in our research, multiple XML documents storing business data are located in the target distributed environment, and an external application wishes to perform OLAP tasks over these XML documents, in order to retrieve knowledge useful for OLAP analysis and prediction to all the distributed environment parties. Such OLAP tasks require the execution of OLAP operations over the collection of XML documents stored in each node in the distributed environment, and the computation of the global (final) result via the composition of all the local (intermediate) results provided by OLAP operations, under the constraints imposed by the SMC model. This means that while each node of the distributed environment is not allowed to access the local (OLAP) result provided by other nodes, the external application has to privately send to all the participating nodes the global (OLAP) result. Such global knowledge can be then exploited by all the participants of the distributed environment for decision making purposes.
In order to support effective and efficient privacy preserving OLAP in the above reference application scenario, we propose an innovative SMC-based privacy preserving OLAP framework over distributed XML documents. The proposed framework is based on the following steps:
• At each node of the distributed environment, business data stored in the XML documents collection are materialized into ad-hoc OLAP views for efficiency purposes. These OLAP views are defined by the external application on the basis of BI goals via meaningful MultiDimensional eXpressions (MDX) [61] queries that are parsed into appropriate sets of XQuery statements finally extracting aggregations from the target XML document collection. The main contributions of our proposed framework are the following: (i) the adaptation of the SMC model to the context of OLAP over distributed XML documents, which is a relevant context in practice; (ii) the definition of a novel task for Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining tailored to OLAP over distributed XML documents, called secure distributed OLAP aggregation task; (iii) an innovative approach for computing privacy preserving versions of OLAP views; (iv) an effective and efficient protocol that implements the secure distributed OLAP aggregation task, called SDO -Secure Distributed OLAP aggregation protocol; (v) the experimental evaluation of the protocol SDO's performance against distributed collections of synthetic XML documents, which proves the effectiveness and the efficiency of the proposed protocol.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce principles and definitions about the novel secure distributed OLAP aggregation task proposed in our research. Section 3 reviews related work that is relevant for our research. In Section 4, we describe our approach for aggregating collections of XML documents into two-dimensional OLAP views. Section 5 focuses the attention on the CUR decomposition method for computing privacy preserving twodimensional OLAP views, along with relevant theoretical properties and results. In Section 6, we provide models, algorithms and theoretical results on the secure distributed OLAP aggregation protocol SDO. Section 7 provides a comprehensive experimental campaign on the efficiency of our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework against collections of synthetic, benchmark and real-life XML documents. Finally, Section 8 contains conclusions of our research and directions for further investigation in the context of privacy preserving OLAP over distributed environments. Fig. 1 shows a reference application scenario example which captures the typical setting of OLAP over distributed XML documents. In the scenario shown in Fig. 1 , an external application wishes to perform OLAP tasks over the following distributed DW-enabled collections of XML documents that store sale data: Electric Parts, Computer Parts, Mechanical Parts, Car Parts.
Secure distributed OLAP aggregation: a novel challenge for privacy preserving OLAP
With respect to the general guidelines given in Section 1, two relevant aspects characterize our proposed reference application scenario.
First, at each node in the distributed environment, business data stored in the collection of XML documents are materialized into a two-dimensional OLAP view. While this can initially appear as a limitation, two-dimensional OLAP views have already demonstrated, beyond their intrinsic simplicity, good capabilities in capturing significant instances of OLAP applications (e.g., see [24] ). On the other hand, two-dimensional OLAP views have lower computational overheads with respect to the materialization, access, processing and probing phases than multidimensional OLAP views. It should be noted that this characteristic of two-dimensional OLAP views plays a more critical role in distributed environments than in centralized ones, as processing multidimensional data in distributed environments is naturally more resource-consuming than in centralized environments (e.g., [19, 25] ). Second, although our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework is general enough to be customized with respect to any arbitrary (distributed) OLAP task, in our research we consider the special case represented by distributed OLAP aggregation tasks. These tasks, which are novel OLAP tasks for distributed BI environments, are introduced in this paper as a meaningful extension of conventional OLAP aggregation tasks in centralized environments (e.g., [22, 35, 48, 73, 84, 85, 94, 23, 58, 5] ), and have been inspired by pioneering research efforts in the context of privacy preserving distributed OLAP (e.g., [4, 77, 46] ). Without going into details, it is easy to understand that distributed OLAP aggregation tasks are fundamental for next-generation distributed BI environments.
Formally, given a set of distributed BI repositories R modeled in terms of OLAP views, a distributed OLAP aggregation task T over R aims at computing the OLAP view V GLOBAL that stores the final aggregations computed on top of all the OLAP views of R. T can either be simple [42] or complex (e.g., [45] ) in nature.
It should be noted that distributed OLAP aggregation tasks can run according to two different modes, namely the Homogeneous Logical Schemas (HoLS) mode and the Heterogeneous Logical Schemas (HeLS) mode. According to the HoLS mode, all the input OLAP views are characterized by an identical (OLAP) logical schema, i.e. identical set of dimensions and measures, whereas in the HeLS mode all or a partition of the input OLAP views are characterized by different (OLAP) logical schemas. In the latter case, OLAP data integration approaches (e.g., [78] ) can be adopted in order to solve the heterogeneities arising among the views' logical-schemas. For sake of simplicity, in our research we focus the attention on the HoLS mode, i.e. namely distributed OLAP aggregation tasks running over a set of OLAP views characterized by an identical logical schema. However, our proposed privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework can easily incorporate within its core layer any (orthogonal) OLAP data integration technique and is thus able of dealing with OLAP views characterized by heterogeneous logical schemas.
Consider Fig. 1 , where the reference application scenario of our research is shown. Here, the HoLS mode is explicitly obtained during the set-up phase of the secure distributed OLAP aggregation task. In this phase, the external application issues an ad-hoc MDX query Q i to each node N i of the distributed environment in order to obtain, at all the nodes, OLAP views characterized by an identical logical schema. This implies that: (i) the sets of dimensions and measures of DW schemas of collections of XML documents stored in nodes of the distributed environment are not disjointed; (ii) the external application is aware of the DW schema of collections of XML documents stored in each node; (iii) the MDX queries are meaningfully parsed into appropriate sets of XQuery statements able to generate the desired OLAP view in each node of the distributed environment. Fig. 3 shows a distributed OLAP aggregation task example, which is based on the SQL aggregate operator SUM. Here, two two-dimensional OLAP views V i and V j having identical logical schema are aggregated into the two-dimensional OLAP view V GLOBAL . Views V i and V j are located at two different nodes of the target distributed environment, namely N i an N j , respectively, and the view V GLOBAL modeling the result of the distributed OLAP aggregation task is located at another node N g . As the previous example suggests, distributed OLAP aggregation tasks are novel important tools for next-generation distributed BI environments. In our research, we specifically focus the attention on the class of SUM-based distributed OLAP aggregation tasks, being SUM a popular aggregate operator for OLAP applications (e.g., [19] ). Despite this, our proposed framework is general enough to deal with more sophisticated distributed OLAP aggregation tasks that embed complex OLAP aggregations (e.g., [45] ) rather than conventional ones (e.g., SUM, COUNT, AVG - [42] ). It should be noted how the latter distributed OLAP model is perfectly compliant with recent research initiatives developed in the context of advanced analytics over complex data (e.g., [10, 13] ).
We now focus on the proper privacy preserving aspects of the proposed distributed OLAP aggregation tasks. Consider again the running example of Fig. 3 . Here, in order to compute the global OLAP view V GLOBAL , at node N j the local OLAP view V j must be aggregated with the local OLAP view V i from node N i . Therefore, V i is disclosed to N j , which, because of this privacy breach, can access sensitive knowledge kept at N i . Our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework aims at preventing privacy breaches that can arise while executing distributed OLAP aggregation tasks. As highlighted in Section 1, the main idea of the proposed approach consists in computing appropriate privacy preserving versions of local OLAP views so that the current node N i receiving view V i−1 from node N i−1 is not allowed to access sensitive knowledge kept in N i−1 .
Related work
As highlighted in Section 1, while Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining has been widely investigated, and a plethora of proposal exists (e.g., [81, 53, 82, 49, 50] ), the problem of effectively and efficiently supporting privacy preserving OLAP over distributed collections of XML documents, which is relevant in practice, has been neglected so far. Hence, our proposed research can reasonable be considered as innovative. However, despite this gap in active literature, three scientific areas still determine the background knowledge for our research: (i) privacy preservation of distributed XML documents; (ii) privacy preservation of OLAP data cubes; (iii) distributed privacy preserving OLAP. In the following, we review significant research efforts done in these scientific areas.
Privacy preservation techniques over distributed XML documents
While there is a large corpus of research efforts focusing the attention on the issue of providing effective and efficient secure access control over XML documents, both on centralized (e.g., [27] ) and distributed (e.g., [8] ) environments, the problem of devising innovative schemes for privacy preservation of (centralized or distributed) XML documents in a database-like meaning is still open and demanding for further investigation, despite its relevance for modern information system applications (e.g., [6] ). On the other hand, the related problem of distributing XML documents in a secure manner has instead received more attention from the research community (e.g., [9, 55] ). Among the sporadic initiatives adhering to the specialized context of privacy preservation techniques over distributed XML documents, which is of interest for our research, [12] proposes a lightweight framework for privacy preserving peer-to-peer (P2P) XML databases in very large publish-subscribe systems, called X PPX, which particularly focuses on the P2P setting. X PPX allows us to simultaneously achieve (i) privacy-preserving fragmentation of XML documents stored in P2P XML databases, and (ii) the creation of trusted groups of peers by means of "self-certifying" XPath [87] links. These amenities are obtained by means of innovative lightweight XPath-based identifiers that exploit the benefits of well-known fingerprinting techniques [68] . XFlat [37] is another method that proposes privacypreserving query-friendly publishing of XML document views in distributed environments, at a provable (query) efficiency. The idea here consists in decomposing XML trees into a set of sub-trees with the same accessibility on each node to all users, and then encrypting and storing each sub-tree in a flat-sequential way.
Privacy preservation techniques over OLAP data cubes
Privacy preservation techniques over OLAP data cubes solve the problem of making privacy preserving a given singleton data cube. The main motivation of this research area argues that today's OLAP server platforms lack of effective countermeasures to face-off relevant-in-practice limitations deriving from privacy breaches. For what regards previous research efforts, apart from some preliminary, sporadic studies in the context of securing data warehouses [11] and data cubes [65] , there exist few works in literature (see [21] for a survey), so that, actually, privacy preserving OLAP can be reasonably considered as a quite-neglected research line, despite its clear relevance.
Contrary to this actual trend, privacy preserving issues in statistical databases, which represent the theoretical foundations of privacy preserving OLAP, have been deeply investigated during past years [1] , and a relevant number of techniques developed in this context are still waiting to be studied, extended and integrated within the core layer of OLAP server platforms. Basically, privacy preserving techniques for statistical databases can be classified in two main classes: restriction-based techniques, and perturbation-based techniques. A similar classification can be provided for more recent privacy preserving OLAP techniques, which are inspired to the former techniques. Recent studies have further confirmed the convergence between privacy preserving issues of statistical databases and OLAP, by studying the privacy preservation of OLAP-like queries over such databases (e.g., [89] ).
Restriction-based techniques propose restricting the number of classes of queries that can be posed to the target database (e.g., [29, 15] ); perturbation-based techniques propose adding random noise at various levels of the target database, ranging from schemas [70] to query answers [7] . As an extension of these basic techniques, auditing query techniques aim at devising intelligent methodologies for detecting which queries must be forbidden, in order to preserve privacy. Therefore, these approaches have particularly been studied in the broader context of restriction-based privacy preserving techniques. Auditing techniques aim at analyzing the past (answered) queries in order to determine whether actual answers can be composed by malicious users to infer sensitive knowledge in the form of answers to forbidden (i.e., unauthorized) queries. To this end, a restriction-based technique needs to audit queries posed to the target data server during an adequately-wide interval of time. Auditing queries in statistical databases is the conceptual and theoretical basis of auditing queries in OLAP systems. Interesting auditing techniques for queries against statistical databases have been proposed in [29] , which introduces a model for auditing average and median queries, and [15] , which proposes a technique for handling the past history of SUM queries in order to reduce the sequence of answered queries, to privacy preservation purposes. More recently, few approaches focusing on the problem of auditing techniques for OLAP data cubes and queries appeared. Among all, we recall: (i) [94] that proposes an interesting information theoretic approach that simply counts the number of cells already covered to answer previous queries in order to establish if a new query should be answered or not; (ii) [60] that introduces a novel notation for auditing range-SUM queries against statistical databases making use of Integer Linear Programming (ILP) tools for detecting if a new range-SUM query can be answered safely or not.
Nevertheless, due to different, specific motivations, both restriction-based and perturbation-based techniques are not effective and efficient in OLAP, while auditing techniques for OLAP still need to demonstrate their validity. Restriction-based techniques are quite ineffective in OLAP since the nature of OLAP analysis is intrinsically interactive, and based on a wide set of operators and query classes. Perturbation-based techniques, which process one data cube cell at time, are quite inefficient in OLAP since they introduce excessive computational overheads when executed on massive data cubes (e.g., [22, 23] ).
Another class of proposals for privacy preserving OLAP research consists in adapting to data cubes consolidated access control schemes inherited from traditional DBMS technology. These schemes establish how client applications must access multidimensional data on the basis of grants and revokes [43] , roles [69] , and authorization rules [51] , thus limiting accesses to sensitive data. Access control techniques are not suitable for OLAP, since, while DBMS access control solutions are implemented on top of relational schemas, so that they efficiently exploit the flexibility offered by such schemas, data cubes are characterized by multidimensional schemas [83] that, contrary to relational ones, do not ensure a high degree of flexibility. In consequence of this, some initiatives focus the attention on the hierarchical nature of OLAP dimensions in order to develop multidimensional access control schemes for data cubes (e.g., [65] ). Data sanitization is a further alternative proposal that asserts removing explicit identifiers from relational tuples in order to obtain anonymous tuples, and, in turn, anonymous OLAP data cells computed over the latter tuples. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that data sanitization approaches are ineffective on online-published data sources [74, 59, 57] . In line with this direction, [93] is a work related to our research, as it properly focuses the attention on the problem of supporting OLAP-like queries over anonymized database tables.
More recently, [85] proposes a cardinality-based inference control scheme that aims at finding sufficient conditions for obtaining safe data cubes, i.e. data cubes such that the number of known values is under a tight bound. In line with this research, [84] proposes a privacy preserving OLAP approach that combines access and inference control techniques [28] , being (i) first one based on the hierarchical nature of data cubes modeled in terms of cuboid lattices [42] and multiresolution of data, and (ii) second one based on directly applying restriction to coarser aggregations of data cubes, and then removing remaining inferences that can be still derived. [85] and [84] are not properly comparable with our work, as they basically combine a technique inspired from statistical databases with an access control scheme, which are both outside the scope of this paper. [48] extends results of [84] via proposing algorithm FMC, which still works on the cuboid lattice to hide sensitive data that cause inference, and argues that hiding these sensitive partitions of data is enough in order to achieve the notion of secure data cubes. [73] proposes a random data distortion technique, called Zero-Sum, for preserving the privacy of data cells while providing accurate answers to range queries. To this end, [73] iteratively alters the values of data cells of the target data cube in such a way as to maintain the marginal sums of data cells along rows and columns of the data cube equal to zero. This ensures the privacy of individual data cells, and the correctness of answers to range queries. When applied to massive data cubes, [73] clearly introduces excessive overheads, which are not comparable with low computational requirements by typical OLAP processing tasks (e.g., [19] ). [58] describes yet another perturbation-based technique for OLAP data cubes, called Cubic-Wise Balance method, whose main goal is that of providing privacy preserving range queries over data cubes. This is achieved via retrieving an appropriate closely-estimated summary data for range queries without providing access to actual individual data values, like in other similar perturbation-based approaches.
Furthermore, in [22] a robust sampling-based framework for privacy preserving OLAP is introduced. The most distinctive characteristic of this framework consists in adopting an innovative privacy OLAP notion, which deals with the problem of preserving the privacy of OLAP aggregations rather than the one of data cube cells, like in conventional perturbation-based privacy preserving OLAP techniques. This results in a greater theoretical soundness, and lower computational overheads due to processing massive-in-size data cubes. By further extending results of [22] , [23] proposes a collection of flexible samplingbased data cube compression techniques for computing privacy preserving OLAP aggregations on data cubes while allowing approximate answers to be efficiently evaluated over such aggregations. Here, compression is used as a tool for speeding-up the evaluation of OLAP queries over massive-in-size data cubes, like in [25] . This novel framework addresses an application scenario where a producer Data Warehouse server provides to consumer OLAP client applications query services over a target data cube subjected to a reference query-workload of interest, which is cooperatively determined by the Data Warehouse server and OLAP client applications. Some ranges of the target data cube are hidden to OLAP client applications, while some others are disclosed to them. As a result, both accuracy and privacy features occur in the described application scenario, which is accomplished by means of the so-called accuracy/privacy contract that determines the accuracy/privacy constraint under which OLAP client applications must access and process multidimensional data stored in the Data Warehouse server.
[5] adds a novel constraining feature to the privacy preserving OLAP model introduced by the previous research [23] via considering even consistency of the target data source to be made privacy preserving, beyond to their accuracy and privacy (like in [23] ). Particularly, [5] focuses the attention on the issue of effectively and efficiently supporting contingency table release in the context of statistical data, like census data, while preserving privacy, accuracy and consistency (of data) simultaneously. Contingency tables can be reasonable considered as first-degree cousins of OLAP data cubes. The solution proposed by [5] consists in a sort of approach producing synthetic data derived in terms of an appropriate set of marginals from the original raw data, and stored in intermediate tables. Then, from these tables, the "nearest" consistent set of marginals are retrieved, which finally represent the privacy preserving released contingency tables. Finally, [35] focuses the attention on the problem of summarizing multidimensional data, like those stored in an OLAP data cube, into lossy synopses supporting the estimation of aggregate range queries by also taking into account privacy issues, similarly to the scenario drawn by [23] . This conveys in the problem of constructing so-called privacy-preserving synopses, which in [35] is solved by means of a probabilistic framework that makes use of histogram-based approaches (e.g., [25] ).
Distributed privacy preserving OLAP
Distributed privacy preservation techniques over OLAP data cubes solve the problem of making privacy preserving distributed OLAP data cubes or, under an alternative interpretation, making privacy preserving an OLAP data cube model over distributed data sources. Deriving problems are similar but different in nature. As regards the first problem, to the best of our knowledge, in literature there not exist any proposal that deals with it, whereas, concerning the second problem, [4] is the state-of-the-art result existent in literature. Our approach belongs to the second distributed privacy preserving OLAP scientific context, as it aims at solving the problem of supporting privacy preserving OLAP over distributed collections of XML documents (which is completely novel in literature), but, under a broader meaning, it also encompasses some characteristics of the first distributed privacy preserving OLAP scientific context. This because our approach consists in computing, at each node of the reference distributed environment, a suitable two-dimensional OLAP view from the target collection of XML documents directly (see Section 2), hence our main privacy preserving distributed task works on (distributed) two-dimensional OLAP views directly (which is reminiscent of the first scientific context). On a sense, this heterogeneity of the nature of the privacy preserving framework we propose further confirms the validity of our research.
By looking at the active literature, while a plethora of initiatives focusing on Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining [16] exists, being [81, 53, 82, 49, 50] some noticeable ones, to the best of our knowledge, only [4, 77, 46] deal with the yetrelevant problem of effectively and efficiently supporting privacy preserving OLAP over distributed data sources, specifically falling in the second scientific context according to the taxonomy provided above. [4] defines a privacy preserving OLAP model over data partitioned across multiple clients using a randomization approach, which is implemented by the so-called Retention Replacement Perturbation algorithm, on the basis of which (i) clients perturb tuples with which they participate to the partition in order to gain row-level privacy, and (ii) server is capable of evaluating OLAP queries against perturbed tables via reconstructing original distributions of attributes involved by such queries. In [4] , authors demonstrate that the proposed distributed privacy preserving OLAP model is safe against privacy breaches. [77] is another distributed privacy preserving OLAP approach that is reminiscent of ours. More specifically, [77] pursues the idea of obtaining a privacy preserving OLAP data cube model from distributed data sources across multiple sites via applying perturbation-based techniques on aggregate data that are retrieved from each singleton site as a baseline step of the main (distributed) OLAP computation task. Finally, [46] focuses the attention on the significant issue of providing efficient data aggregation while preserving privacy over wireless sensor networks. The proposed solution is represented by two privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes that make use of innovative additive aggregation functions, being these schemes named as Cluster-based Private Data Aggregation (CPDA) and Slice-Mix-AggRegaTe (SMART), respectively. Proposed aggregation functions fully-exploit topology and dynamics of the underlying wireless sensor network, and bridge the gap between collaborative data collection over such networks and data privacy needs.
Aggregating collections of XML documents into two-dimensional OLAP views
In our proposed privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, collections of XML documents stored in nodes of the target distributed environment are materialized into two-dimensional OLAP views, for query efficiency purposes. Several recent approaches have addressed the challenging issue of rigorously defining and efficiently implementing GROUP-BY [10, 39, 63] and CUBE [86] operators within XML query languages, that are not supported by the original XQuery language. In particular, Wiwatwattana et al. [86] propose the model Xˆ3, which makes a major step towards the definition of a reliable CUBE operator over XML data. However, despite such initial result, as even recognized in [86] , aggregating OLAP data cells from native XML documents is still a challenging issue. Therefore we adopt the approach of (pre-)materializing two-dimensional OLAP views from collections of XML documents directly (i.e., in an on-the-fly manner), in order to avoid resource-consuming aggregate query evaluation over native XML documents during the execution of the secure distributed OLAP aggregation task. It should be noted that the latter situation would result in a critical bottleneck for our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, and would dramatically degrade the performance. Apart from performance, dealing with (pre-materialized) two-dimensional OLAP views rather than with native XML documents directly well-complies with the privacy preserving distributed OLAP approach we propose, being our method for computing privacy preserving versions of local OLAP views (see Section 1) inherited from privacy preserving theoretical tools for large matrices (see Section 4). As also suggested by the distributed OLAP aggregation task example depicted in Fig. 3 , matrices are completely suitable to represent two-dimensional OLAP views that are of interest to our research, hence the privacy preserving method used in our framework is perfectly suitable to fulfill the requirements dictated by the privacy preserving distributed OLAP scenario investigated in our research (see Section 2). In addition to this, in our reference application scenario, target external applications and participants are both interested in the final global OLAP (aggregate) result, rather than in lower-degree aggregations over sub-trees of XML documents collections. The use of two-dimensional OLAP views perfectly fits this goal, as thanks to such views we are able of "globally" capturing the OLAP-like knowledge kept in the whole XML documents, while discarding aggregations over sub-ranges of the reference data domain defined by the documents themselves.
Despite some drawbacks (such as update management) that merit further research, the (pre-)materialization approach effectively and efficiently supports privacy preserving distributed OLAP over XML documents, and it is also in line with some recent research initiatives like [54] that makes use of an RDBMS in order to achieve the same goal.
For sake of simplicity, we consider a case study focusing on an XML collection consisting of a singleton XML document only, as the more significant case represented by a collection of multiple XML documents can be straightforwardly derived from the actual case. Fig. 4 shows a DW-enabled XML document DW-XML that stores business data on sales performed in stores located in some geographical areas, which are hierarchically organized into the (OLAP) hierarchy Country → State → Store, during a certain interval of time. In particular, Fig. 4 shows an excerpt of the XML document on sales at the stores Wal-Mart and Carrefour located in the USA states Indiana and Kentucky, respectively, during [Mar 08:Apr 08]. Fig. 5 shows instead the two-dimensional OLAP view V whose data cells are generated via a simultaneous aggregation of elements stored in the XML document of Fig. 4 , given a certain OLAP logical schema. In particular, the view V in the running example is characterized by the dimensions Time (with granularity Month) and Zone (with granularity State), respectively, and the measure Sale (in EUR). In particular, as shown in Fig. 5 , elements of the XML document excerpt of Fig. 4 The cubing algorithm [20] exploited to (pre-)materialize two-dimensional OLAP views from collections of XML documents is completely orthogonal to our proposed privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework. This further extends the capabil- ities of our proposed framework, which is thus suitable to be integrated with any arbitrary cubing algorithm for XML data, due to the fact that the proper secure distributed OLAP aggregation protocol SDO is abstracted on OLAP views extracted by means of the algorithm itself.
A reliable solution consists of making use of Xˆ3 [86] , which can be reasonably considered as the state-of-the-art cubing algorithm. The Xˆ3-extended XQuery statement which allows us to extract the two-dimensional OLAP view V of Fig. 5 from the XML document excerpt of Fig. 4 is shown in Fig. 6 .
CUR-based privacy preserving two-dimensional OLAP views
Given the local OLAP view V 0 at the first node N 0 of the target distributed environment, a critical phase of our proposed secure distributed OLAP aggregation protocol SDO is the computation of the privacy preserving version of V 0 , V PP 0 , which is then aggregated with the local view V 1 of the node N 1 that "follows" N 0 in the fixed node ordering. It is easy to understand how this first-step operation heavily impacts the overall degree of privacy preservation of the distributed OLAP aggregation protocol. Therefore, here the critical issue is how to effectively and efficiently compute a privacy preserving two-dimensional OLAP view from a given two-dimensional OLAP view. This problem has received great attention with equal emphasis on both ROLAP (e.g., [35, 48, 84, 85, 94] ) and MOLAP (e.g., [22, 73, 23, 58, 5] ) cubes. Despite this proliferation, state-of-the-art proposals cannot be directly integrated in our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, as they are inherently resource-consuming, hence unsuitable for a distributed computation task.
Based on this motivation, we propose exploiting the CUR matrix decomposition [30] to compute privacy preserving two-dimensional OLAP views. As argued by Drineas et al. [31] , the CUR matrix decomposition can be used for privacy preservation purposes.
In more detail, CUR is a matrix decomposition method for computing approximate representations of large matrices. It can be applied to several application contexts ranging from classification problems to similarity search problems, from analysis of biological data to compression of hyper-spectral data for image processing, and so forth [30] .
Formally, given a large m × n matrix A, a CUR matrix decomposition is a low-rank approximation of A, denoted by A , that represents A in terms of a small number of columns and rows of A, as follows:
where: (i) C is an m × c matrix that stores O (1) columns of A; (ii) R is an r × n matrix that stores O (1) rows of A; (iii) U is a c × r carefully-chosen matrix. In particular, the number of columns of C consists of c = θ(1/ε 2 ) columns of A, and the number of rows of R consists of r = θ(1/ε 2 ) rows of A, respectively, with ε > 0 arbitrarily small. C and R are built by means of adaptive sampling [76] , via c (r, respectively) trials by picking a column (a row, respectively) of A with probability p j defined as follows:
whereas the probability p i for rows is defined as follows:
respectively. Given a matrix A, computing a CUR decomposition of A is a difficult problem [30] . With respect to complexity, the upper bound of the complexity of computing a CUR decomposition of an m × n matrix A is represented by the complexity of computing the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) [41] of A, which is O (min{m · n 2 , m 2 · n}) in time [30] . This cost can be prohibitive for large matrices one can find in real-world applications. Therefore, several approaches for effectively and efficiently computing CUR decompositions of large matrices have been proposed.
Given an m × n matrix A, Drineas at al. [30] 
where: (i) A 2 denotes the spectral norm [41] of A, which is defined as follows:
such that A H denotes the conjugate transpose matrix of A, and Λ A the set of eigenvalues of A, respectively; (ii) A F denotes the Frobenius norm [41] of A, which is defined as follows:
(iii) A k denotes the rank-k approximation of A given by the SVD [30] , such that k ∈ {1, . . . , rank(A)}. For k = k * "best" rank-k approximation of A given by the SVD (low-rank approximation), i.e. by picking
columns of A, (4) can be re-formulated as follows [30] :
The satisfaction of inequality (7) ensures that A provides a "good" approximation of A, while being still different from A. by the output m × n matrix A provided by the CUR decomposition, from a given two-dimensional OLAP view, which can be reasonably represented by the input m × n matrix A in the CUR decomposition process.
Theoretical analysis and results on the privacy preservation capabilities of the CUR decomposition method
Inequality (7) also embeds a probabilistic interpretation, which can be derived from results in [30] . For each pair of ε > 0 and δ > 0 arbitrarily small, with high probability the following inequality holds [64] :
More precisely, (8) gives us a probabilistic (lower) bound on the probability of event e D = A = A , which models the case of obtaining the approximate matrix A as different from the input matrix A. We denote as P(e D ) the probability associated with this event. In our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, we are indeed interested in formally estimating the probability of the complementary (probabilistic) event of e D , namely e E = A ≡ A , which models the case of obtaining the approximate matrix A as equal to the input matrix A. We denote as P(e E ) the probability associated with this event. P(e E )
formally models the privacy risk of our framework, that is the probability of the occurrence of privacy breaches, which, in our reference framework, are represented by the event such that A , or cell partitions of A , is equal to A, or cell partitions of A. Furthermore, this model allows us to study how much our proposed framework is secure against these possible privacy breaches, again in a probabilistic manner. By recalling that P(e E ) = 1 − P(e D ), the following probabilistic (upper) bound on the probability of event e E = A ≡ A can be derived, as stated by Theorem 1:
Theorem 1. Given an m × n matrix A, such that m > 0 and n > 0, and its CUR-based approximating matrix A , for each pair ε, δ , such that ε > 0 and δ > 0 arbitrarily small, the probability of the event e E = A ≡ A is superiorly bounded by the quantity
Proof. (8) can be re-written as follows:
By simple sign inversion, (10) can be re-written as follows:
i.e.:
By noticing that, for this theoretical probabilistic setting, P(e D ) is defined as follows:
and P(e E ) is defined as follows:
respectively, thanks to the central limit theorem and the complementary-event's probability theorem [64] , (12) can be reformulated as follows:
which is equal to (9). 2
Theorem 1 is a relevant theoretical result of our research. It further confirms us the suitability of the CUR decomposition method [30] in supporting Privacy Preserving Data Mining, as argued in [31] , since the probability of obtaining two equal matrices is negligible in practice. Thanks to Theorem 1, in our research we achieve an effective, efficient and, above all, theoretically-sound approach for computing a privacy preserving two-dimensional OLAP view from the input twodimensional OLAP view, which is a fundamental and critical step of the secure distributed OLAP aggregation task.
Theoretical analysis and results on the re-construction capabilities of the CUR decomposition method
Another critical property that is central to theoretical aspects of the CUR decomposition method consists in assessing the capabilities of the method in re-constructing the original matrix A from the approximating matrix A that is retrieved by the method itself. In fact, beyond playing a central role in the effectiveness of the proposed privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, the re-construction property also ensures the theoretical convergence of conceptual constructs and theory tools of the framework.
In order to prove the re-construction property ensured by the CUR decomposition method, we provide Theorem 2 (see next) whose proof is characterized by a structure inspired to a theoretical model proposed in [4] , which, as highlighted in Section 3.3, is the state-of-the-art result in the context of perturbation-based distributed privacy preservation techniques over OLAP data cubes. In more detail, as regards the re-construction property ensured by the proposed Retention Replacement Perturbation algorithm, in [4] authors provide rigorous probabilistic bounds over aggregates that are re-constructed from a relational table that has been perturbed by means of their algorithm. These aggregates are defined in terms of input range queries over the perturbed relational table, and their values are compared with the values of aggregates retrieved by the same queries over the original relational table. Here, we follow a similar structure, i.e. we study the re-construction property of the CUR decomposition method via considering the aggregate values of range queries over the approximating matrix A in comparison with the aggregate values of the same queries over the original matrix A.
Before to provide Theorem 2, some definitions are necessary. First, we define a two-dimensional range query Q over the m × n matrix A (A , respectively) as follows: On the basis of well-understood matrix algebra [41] principles, the evaluation of Q over A (A , respectively) can be expressed as follows:
such that: (i) x models an m-dimensional vector whose elements x[i], with 0 i m − 1, are defined as follows:
(ii) y models an n-dimensional vector whose elements y[ j], with 0 j n − 1, are defined as follows:
and (iii) z models the answer to Q (z models the approximate answer to Q , respectively). For the sake of clarity, Theorem 2 proves that the approximate answer to Q , z , is probabilistically-close to the exact answer to Q , z, or, in other words, the re-construction property of the CUR decomposition method.
Second, we introduce the concept of re-constructible function, still inspired by 4, whose formal definition is provided in Definition 1. Intuitively enough, a numeric function γ is said to be re-constructible iff it allows us to "invert" the transformation of the original matrix A, or cell partitions of A, in the perturbed matrix A (due to the CUR decomposition method, in our case), or cell partitions of A . In our theoretical analysis, we interpret numeric functions γ as the data distributions associated to elements of the original matrix A (the approximating matrix A , respectively). A relevant property of a reconstructible function γ is that of verifying whether it is n, ε, δ -re-constructible by means of the so-called re-constructing function γ , such that n is the number of items in γ , and ε and δ are positive integers arbitrarily small. In other words, this corresponds to verifying whether an unbiased estimator [64] γ for γ exists. If this is the case, γ gives us theoreticallyproofed probabilistic bounds on the error we commit in reconstructing the function γ (by means of γ ). Based on these theoretical constructs and concepts, we now focus the attention on re-constructing the answer z to a given range query Q = [ l 1 :u 1 ; l 2 :u 2 ] over A from the approximating matrix A (or, equally, retrieving the approximate answer to Q , z ) and the probabilities p i (3) and p j (2) exploited by the CUR decomposition method to obtain A from A.
For this theoretical setting, the re-constructing function γ we adopt, still inspired by [4] , is defined as follows:
denotes an element of A ; (ii) p i (3) denotes the probability of picking the i-th row of A during the CUR decomposition method; (iii) p j (2) denotes the probability of picking the j-th column of A during the CUR decomposition method; (iv) b is defined as follows:
such that max{B} denotes the operator max over the elements of B, with B in {A, A }, and min{B} denotes the operator min over the elements of B, with B in {A, A }, respectively. Theorem 2 states that the re-constructing function γ (20) is an unbiased estimator for the function γ determined by the CUR decomposition method, under the following condition:
such that: (i) n denotes the number of elements of A involved in the evaluation of Q ; (ii) ε and δ are positive integers arbitrarily small; (iii) p i and p j are the probabilities (3) and (2), respectively, exploited by the CUR decomposition method. 
Theorem 2. Let the value
Proof. Let X ij denote a random variable [64] 
As a consequence, the following formula holds: (25) In turn, the following formula holds: (27) is given by the following formula:
From (23) and (25), (28) is finally given by the following formula:
As a consequence, the following formula holds:
Furthermore, let 1 denote the range of Q on the dimension d 1 of A (A , respectively) . From (16) , it clearly follows that the cardinality of 1 , 1 , is given by the following formula:
Similarly, let 2 denote the range of Q on the dimension d 2 of A (A , respectively). From (16) , it clearly follows again that the cardinality of 2 , 2 , is given by the following formula:
Also, let Q denote the volume (or selectivity [18] ) of Q . Based on (16), (31) and (32), Q is given by the following formula:
such that 1 denotes the cardinality of 1 , and 2 denotes the cardinality of 2 , respectively. Now, let U ij denote a random variable defined as the summation of random variables Z ij [64] over the two-dimensional domain of A (A , respectively) modeling the range of Q , i.e. [ l 1 :u 1 ; l 2 :u 2 ] that is defined as follows:
It should be noted that random variables U ij are those associated to the evaluation of the approximate answer to Q , z , and that they underlie the definition of the re-constructing function γ (20) . The number of elements of A involved in the Q 's evaluation process, n (or, equally, the number of items of γ − γ , respectively), is given by the following formula:
How to model the approximate evaluation of Q over A in a probabilistic manner? In order to answer this critical question, first note that each one among the n elements A [i] [ j] of A may contribute (i.e., U ij = 1) or not (i.e., U ij = 0) to the approximate answer to Q , z . Our final aim is to find probabilistic bounds for the probability P(U ij = 1). Since random variables Z ij are i.i.d. and random variables U ij are defined as the summation of Z ij , then U ij are independent Bernoulli random variables [64] .
Under the condition (22), by applying the well-known Chernoff bound [64] , the following inequality holds:
where p i and p j are the probabilities (3) and (2), respectively, exploited by the CUR decomposition method, and ε is a positive integer arbitrarily small; (iv) δ is a positive integer arbitrarily small. From (36) , it follows that, with probability greater than 1 − δ, the following inequality holds:
from which it follows that |γ − γ | < ε with probability 1 − δ, and that re-constructing function γ (20) is an unbiased estimator for the function γ determined by the CUR decomposition method. 2
Finally, for the sake of completeness, from (17) and (20) the approximate answer to Q , z , can be obtained as follows:
Procedure: SDOAppRun Participant: External Application App Body: 
waitMessage("STOP_SDO", App); 
where p i and p j are the probabilities (3) and (2), respectively, exploited by the CUR decomposition method, and b is the quantity (21).
A reliable secure distributed OLAP aggregation protocol
In our framework, the secure distributed OLAP aggregation task is implemented by the proposed protocol SDO. According to the guidelines given in Sections 1 and 2, in our reference application scenario participants that execute SDO, referred to as SDO participants, are the following: (i) the external application App wishing to perform OLAP over the distributed collections of XML documents, X i denoting the collection of XML documents stored at the node N i ; (ii) the n nodes N i , with 0 i n − 1, populating the distributed environment that participate to the target distributed OLAP setting. In particular, with respect to the second class of SDO participants, we distinguish between the node N 0 , which is the first one in the fixed node ordering, and nodes N i , with 1 i n − 1.
According to the models and paradigms given in Sections 1 and 2, in SDO the following procedures are defined: (i) procedure SDOAppRun (see Fig. 7 ), which is implemented by the SDO participant external application App; (ii) procedure SDONode0Run (see Fig. 8 ), which is implemented by the SDO participant node N 0 ; (iii) procedure SDONodeIRun (see Fig. 9 ), which is implemented by the SDO participant node N i , with 1 i n − 1.
The meaning of the sub-procedures exploited by the main procedures of SDO (i.e., SDOAppRun, SDONode0Run, and SDONodeIRun) is self-explicative. One item of interest is the method used to reconstruct the exact (see Section 1) global OLAP view V GLOBAL from the views V PP n−1 , V 0 , and V PP 0 (sub-procedure reconstructGlobalView of SDONode0Run). From Section 2, recall that in our research we specifically focus the attention on the class of SUM-based distributed OLAP aggregation tasks, while still being our proposed framework general enough to deal with more sophisticated OLAP aggregations. Thanks to the fact that SUM-based OLAP aggregation is a non-holistic operator [42] , it is easy to demonstrate that V GLOBAL can be reconstructed as follows, as formally stated by Theorem 3: 
waitMessage("STOP_SDO", App); (42) Contrary to this, for the sole instance represented by the first node N 0 , the privacy preserving view V PP 0 is directly obtained from the local view V 0 (see Section 1) via the CUR-based approximation method (see Section 5) . Hence, with respect to privacy preserving views located at nodes of the reference distributed environment, the following equalities hold:
Based on (42) , by applying simple mathematical substitutions, (43) can be re-written as follows:
Based on (44) , (41) can be expanded as follows: (45) i.e.: (46) which, from Section 1, represents the (exact) final result of the target distributed OLAP aggregation task. this phenomenon opens to interesting theoretical as well as query-optimization opportunities to be embedded within the proposed privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework.
As a useful corollary deriving from Theorem 3 (Corollary 1), it follows that our proposed framework is orthogonal to the specific method used to obtain the privacy preserving view V PP i at node N i (CUR, in our case), hence it maintains its validity and generality with any arbitrary privacy preserving method from the state-of-the-art literature (e.g., [22, 35, 48, 73, 84, 85, 94, 23, 58, 5] ). This gives further merits to our research.
Corollary 1.
The proposed privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework is orthogonal to the method used to compute privacy preserving two-dimensional OLAP views.
Differential privacy notions for privacy preserving distributed OLAP
Let us now focus on other theoretical properties of our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework that are related to the well-understood context of differential privacy [32] . Based on the non-holistic nature of SUM-based OLAP aggregations, given a local view V i at node N i , we introduce two different notations of differential privacy for the privacy preserving process over V i (i.e., V is defined as follows:
The second differential privacy notion, formally introduced by Definition 3, is named as marginal-differential privacy, denoted by P are defined as follows: Starting from the basic differential privacy notions, their global versions are derived in our framework as follows, respectively. First, from Section 1, the following two critical aspects of our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework should be clear enough: (i) the full-differential privacy P (49) such that P F i denotes the full-differential privacy at node N i . Intuitively enough, similarly to Theorem 3, Definition 4 can be exploited for further theoretical stuff as well as query-optimization opportunities. 
denotes the marginal-differential privacy at node N i .
Definition 4. Given an arbitrary SUM-based secure OLAP aggregation task T over a distributed environment populated by n nodes, the global full-differential privacy associated to T , denoted by P F
T , is defined as follows: 
Experimental evaluation and analysis
In order to assess the effectiveness and the efficiency of our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, we conducted a comprehensive experimental campaign on distributed collections of synthetic, benchmark and real-life XML documents stored in (synthetic, benchmark and real-life) XML data sets, against which we tested the performance of the proposed secure distributed OLAP aggregation protocol SDO under the ranging of several experimental parameters. This finally allowed us to achieve a wide and reliable experimental evaluation and analysis.
First, we provide a description about the XML data sets adopted in our experimental campaign. For what regards synthetic XML data sets (Table 1 reports the main characteristics of these data sets), element values of the synthetic XML documents have been generated according to three distinct data distributions, namely Uniform [18] , Gauss [64] , and Zipf [95] . In more detail, Uniform data sets have been generated by means of a Uniform distribution on the interval [75, 125] ; Gauss data sets have been generated by means of a normal Gauss distribution; Zipf data sets have been generated by means of a Zipf distribution whose parameter z ranges on the interval [0.5, 0.9]. As regards benchmark XML data sets ( Table 2 reports the main characteristics of these data sets), we considered the popular data sets XMark [71] , the XML-version of TPC-H [79] and XBench [92] . In particular, for the data set TCP-H, we considered the XML document extracted from the table Lineitem, which is the biggest one among those composing the whole data set. Finally, as regards real-life XML data sets (Table 3 reports the main characteristics of these data sets), we considered the well-known data sets Treebank [80] , SwissProt [75] and NASA [44] . In turn, from each one of these XML data sets, we extracted a 2,000 × 2,000 two-dimensional OLAP view, whose (two-dimensional) data cells follow the same distribution of the underlying (XML) data set.
We defined four kinds of experiment. In the first kind of experiment, we analyze the privacy preserving capabilities of the CUR decomposition method on a singleton two-dimensional OLAP view with respect to the ranging of the number of columns c exploited by the method itself to compute privacy preserving OLAP views (see Section 5) . In the second kind of experiment, we conducted a similar experience but focused to study the CUR-decomposition's privacy preserving capabilities with respect to the ranging of the probability p j (2) of picking the j-th column of the target OLAP view during the decomposition process (see Section 5). In the third kind of experiment, we analyze the privacy preserving capabilities of our distributed OLAP framework, by studying how the "privacy degree" of distributed OLAP views, stored at nodes of the target experimental setting, varies across the nodes under the execution of a SUM-based distributed OLAP aggregation task (see Sections 1 and 2). In all the first three kinds of experiment, we considered Zero-Sum [73] as the comparison method. This because of three main reasons: (i) Zero-Sum makes use of a matrix-like formalism to face-off and solve the privacy preserving of OLAP data cubes, like ours; (ii) Zero-Sum can be reasonably considered as one of the state-of-the-art perturbation-based approach for centralized privacy preserving OLAP, as highlighted in Section 3; (iii) due to its simplicity, Zero-Sum can be easily extended as to deal with the more probing case of distributed privacy preserving OLAP, like the one addressed and solved by our proposed framework (in this extended implementation, the "original" method Zero-Sum plays the same role of the one played by the CUR decomposition method in our framework, i.e. dealing with the privacy preservation of a singleton two-dimensional OLAP view). Finally, in the fourth kind of experiment, we stressed the sensitivity of the CUR decomposition method by studying the variation of the probability P(e E ) (14) of the event of e E = A ≡ A , which models the case of obtaining the approximate matrix A as equal to the input matrix A (see Section 5), with respect to the ranging of the probability p j (2) (like in the second kind of experiment).
As regards the metrics of evaluating our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, we considered the privacy factor F P introduced by Sung et al. in [73] , which gives a reliable measure of how much a privacy preserving OLAP data cube (OLAP view, respectively) D preserves the privacy of the original OLAP data cube (OLAP view, respectively) D by inspecting the privacy of cells of D with respect to cells of D. In more detail, let (i) D be the input data cube, (ii) D be the privacy preserving data cube computed by means of a given (privacy preserving) method, (iii) X{k} be a data cube cell having k as multidimensional index, with X in {D, D }, the privacy factor F P is defined as follows [73] : Fig. 10 shows the results obtained from the first kind of experiment, i.e. the percentage variation of the privacy factor F P with respect to the number of columns c on 2,000 × 2,000 two-dimensional OLAP views extracted from the synthetic (a), benchmark (b) and real-life (c) XML data sets. With respect to the comparison approach Zero-Sum, the parameter c models the number of blocks of the partition used to compute the final privacy preserving OLAP view [73] . As shown by Fig. 10 , privacy factor values ensured by the CUR decomposition method are high so that obtained (perturbed) OLAP views are privacy preserving accordingly. Also, it turns that the CUR decomposition method outperforms Zero-Sum. Note that, with respect to the synthetic XML data sets, the CUR decomposition method works well on Uniform data sets rather than on Gauss and Zipf data sets (for which the performance is still high), because of the sampling phase introduced by the method (as widely-known, sampling works well on Uniform data sets [26] rather than other kinds of data sets). Fig. 11 shows the results obtained from the second kind of experiment, i.e. the percentage variation of the privacy factor F P with respect to the probability p j (2) on the target OLAP views considered in our experimental assessment. With respect to the comparison approach Zero-Sum, the parameter p j models the probability of perturbing data cube cells belonging to the j-th block of the partition used to compute the final privacy preserving OLAP view [73] . Like for the case of the first kind of experiment, as confirmed by Fig. 11 , we again observed a good performance of the CUR decomposition method. Fig. 12 shows the results obtained from the third kind of experiment, i.e. the percentage variation of the privacy factor F P with respect to the position i of nodes populating a target experimental distributed environment composed by 20 nodes, such that each node stores one singleton OLAP view among those considered in our experimental assessment. In more detail, in this experiment we inspected the "privacy degree" of each new local OLAP view generated in each node by a singleton aggregation step of the whole distributed OLAP aggregation task. As shown by Fig. 12 , the privacy factor F P increases with the node position, i.e. each new local OLAP view achieves a higher privacy degree than the degree of previous views (in the fixed node ordering). The latter is a nice property confirming that our proposed privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework fully satisfies the rigorous requirements and constraints posed by the SMC model. Also, Fig. 12 demonstrates that the proposed privacy framework, beyond ensuring a good privacy preservation effect on singleton twodimensional OLAP views as confirmed by the previous two kinds of experiment, exposes a good performance even over the target experimental distributed environment, hence it perfectly fulfills the initial goals (i.e., effectively and efficiently supporting secure distributed OLAP aggregation tasks -see Sections 1 and 2), yet outperforming the comparison approach Zero-Sum in a distributed setting as well as in a centralized one.
Finally, Fig. 13 shows the results obtained from the fourth kind of experiment, i.e. the variation of the probability P(e E ) (14) with respect to the ranging of the probability p j (2) , both being critical model parameters of the CUR decomposition method, again on the target OLAP views considered in our experimental assessment. As shown in Fig. 13 , we observe an initial increase of P(e E ) as p j increases (as expected), but then P(e E ) makes stable to around under the value 0.5. This further confirms to us the benefits of the CUR decomposition method in computing effective privacy preserving OLAP views. Concluding, our comprehensive experimental campaign conducted on distributed collections of synthetic, benchmark and real-life XML data sets, has clearly demonstrated, under the stressing of a wide variety of experimental parameters, the effectiveness and the efficiency of the proposed privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, even in comparison with the performance of the state-of-the-art perturbation-based method Zero-Sum.
Conclusions and future work
Inspired by research challenges arising in next-generation distributed BI environments relying on (distributed) collections of XML documents, in this paper we have proposed a novel secure distributed OLAP aggregation task, along with the proposal of an effective and efficient SMC-based privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework able of implementing this novel task via the protocol SDO in a trustworthy and reliable manner. We have provided several theoretical properties of the proposed framework, which make it theoretically-sound and solid. The second contribution of this research is the experimental assessment of the proposed framework against distributed collections of synthetic, benchmark and real-life XML documents. The assessment has validated the benefits due to our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, even in comparison with the performance of the state-of-the-art perturbation-based method Zero-Sum. Future work will focus on the following three main problems: (i) assuring the robustness of the framework with respect to coalitions of attackers; (ii) efficiently supporting updates on the distributed collections of XML documents that aliment the OLAP views on top of which distributed OLAP aggregation tasks are performed; (iii) integrating the proposed framework within the core layer of next-generation Data Warehousing and Data Mining server systems, and building useful real-life case studies in emerging application scenarios (e.g., analytics over complex data [10, 13] ).
